Incentives and political economy/ Jean-Jacques Laffont
Material type:![Text](/opac-tmpl/lib/famfamfam/BK.png)
Item type | Current library | Call number | Status | Date due | Barcode | Item holds |
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Central Library, Sikkim University General Book Section | 330 LAF/I (Browse shelf(Opens below)) | Available | P03293 |
Political Economy with a Benevolent Monarch --
The Design of Democratic Institutions --
Political Economy in Democratic Countries --
The Chicago View of Interest Group Politics --
The Complete Contracting Approach --
The Incomplete Contracting Approach --
Adding Asymmetric Information --
Endogenous Coalition Formation --
Politicians as Informed Supervisors --
The Complete Contract Approach to Constitutional Design --
A Simple Supervision Model --
The Optimal Constitution Without Supervision --
The Supervision Technology --
Optimal Incentives for the Politician --
Optimal Collusion-proof Constitution --
Equilibrium Collusion --
An Incentive Theory of the Separation of Powers --
Separation of Powers and Yardstick Competition --
A Model with Three Types --
Single Non-benevolent Politician --
Separation of Politicians --
Collusion-proof Constraints --
Optimal Constitution under Separation --
Comparative Statics: Rent and Welfare --
Generalization of the Results --
Prudent Behavior and Various Preferences --
Discriminatory Side-contracting Offers --
Collusion Between the Politicians --
Checks and Balances --
The Model --
Optimal Symmetric Constitution --
Supervision and Division of Tasks --
Multidimensional Collusion Activities --
A Model with Three Politicians --
Optimal Supervisory Structures --
Flexibility Versus Discretion in Constitutional Design --
Political Economy and Industrial Policy --
Political Interference in the Rent-Efficiency Trade-off --
Ownership Matters --
Incentives against Capture as a Constitutional Rule.
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