Incentives and political economy/ (Record no. 148633)
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| 000 -LEADER | |
|---|---|
| fixed length control field | 00363nam a2200133Ia 4500 |
| 020 ## - INTERNATIONAL STANDARD BOOK NUMBER | |
| International Standard Book Number | 9780198294245 |
| 040 ## - CATALOGING SOURCE | |
| Transcribing agency | CUS |
| 082 ## - DEWEY DECIMAL CLASSIFICATION NUMBER | |
| Classification number | 330 |
| Item number | LAF/I |
| 100 ## - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
| Personal name | Laffout, Jean-Jacques |
| 245 #0 - TITLE STATEMENT | |
| Title | Incentives and political economy/ |
| Statement of responsibility, etc. | Jean-Jacques Laffont |
| 260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. (IMPRINT) | |
| Place of publication, distribution, etc. | New York: |
| Name of publisher, distributor, etc. | Oxford University Press, |
| Date of publication, distribution, etc. | 2000. |
| 300 ## - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION | |
| Extent | xii, 257 p. : |
| Other physical details | ill. ; |
| Dimensions | 23 cm. |
| 440 ## - SERIES | |
| Title | (Clarendon lectures in economics) |
| 505 ## - FORMATTED CONTENTS NOTE | |
| Formatted contents note | Political Economy with a Benevolent Monarch --<br/>The Design of Democratic Institutions --<br/>Political Economy in Democratic Countries --<br/>The Chicago View of Interest Group Politics --<br/>The Complete Contracting Approach --<br/>The Incomplete Contracting Approach --<br/>Adding Asymmetric Information --<br/>Endogenous Coalition Formation --<br/>Politicians as Informed Supervisors --<br/>The Complete Contract Approach to Constitutional Design --<br/>A Simple Supervision Model --<br/>The Optimal Constitution Without Supervision --<br/>The Supervision Technology --<br/>Optimal Incentives for the Politician --<br/>Optimal Collusion-proof Constitution --<br/>Equilibrium Collusion --<br/>An Incentive Theory of the Separation of Powers --<br/>Separation of Powers and Yardstick Competition --<br/>A Model with Three Types --<br/>Single Non-benevolent Politician --<br/>Separation of Politicians --<br/>Collusion-proof Constraints --<br/>Optimal Constitution under Separation --<br/>Comparative Statics: Rent and Welfare --<br/>Generalization of the Results --<br/>Prudent Behavior and Various Preferences --<br/>Discriminatory Side-contracting Offers --<br/>Collusion Between the Politicians --<br/>Checks and Balances --<br/>The Model --<br/>Optimal Symmetric Constitution --<br/>Supervision and Division of Tasks --<br/>Multidimensional Collusion Activities --<br/>A Model with Three Politicians --<br/>Optimal Supervisory Structures --<br/>Flexibility Versus Discretion in Constitutional Design --<br/>Political Economy and Industrial Policy --<br/>Political Interference in the Rent-Efficiency Trade-off --<br/>Ownership Matters --<br/>Incentives against Capture as a Constitutional Rule. |
| 650 ## - SUBJECT | |
| Keyword | Commercial policy |
| 650 ## - SUBJECT | |
| Keyword | Economic policy |
| 650 ## - SUBJECT | |
| Keyword | Industrial policy |
| 650 ## - SUBJECT | |
| Keyword | Incentives in industry |
| 650 ## - SUBJECT | |
| Keyword | Industrial promotion |
| 650 ## - SUBJECT | |
| Keyword | Economics |
| 942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA) | |
| Koha item type | General Books |
| Withdrawn status | Lost status | Damaged status | Not for loan | Home library | Current library | Shelving location | Date acquired | Full call number | Accession number | Date last seen | Date last checked out | Koha item type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Central Library, Sikkim University | Central Library, Sikkim University | General Book Section | 28/08/2016 | 330 LAF/I | P03293 | 28/02/2020 | 28/02/2020 | General Books |