Thinking like a lawyer/ an introduction to legal reasoning Vandevelde,Kenneth J.

INTRODUCTION, 1
I. How Lawyers Think, i
II. 'The Plan of This Book, 4
III. Thinking Like a Law Student, 6
PART ONS
BASIC LEGAL REASONING
1. IDENTIFYING APPLICABLE LAW, 9
I. The Sources of American Law, lo
A. Enacted Law, ii
1. The Legislative Process, 12
2. The Administrative Process, 14
B. Case Law, 15
1. The District Court, 16
a. Bringing a Dispute Before the Court, 16
h. Identifying Issues, 20
c. Deciding Issues, 21
d. Distinguishing Between Issues of Law and Fact, 24
2. The Court of Appeals, 25
3. The Supreme Court, 27
II. Identifying Applicable Law, 28
A. Identifying the Government with Power:
An Introduction to Choice of Law Theory, 28
1. Vertical Choice of Law Analysis, 29
2. Horizontal Choice of Law Analysis, 29
B. Identifying Law by Subject Matter:
An Introduction to Rule Analysis, 31
1. The Nature of Rules: Form, 31
2. The Nature of Rules: Substance, 32
3. The Problem of Generality, 33
c. Identifying Void Rules: An Introduction
to Constitutionalism, 34 ,
2, ANALYZING THE LAW, 37
I. Analyzing Statutes, 37
II. Analyzing Cases, 40
A. The Components of a Case, 40
1. Facts, 40
2. Procedural History, 40
3. Questions Presented, 41
4. Rules of Law, 41
5. Application of Law to Fact, 42
6. Holding, 45
7. Disposition, 47
8. Dissents and Concurrences, 47
B. An Introduction to Stare Decisis, 50
III. Analyzing Rights and Duties, 53
A. The Meaning of Right and Duty, 53
B. Three Characteristics of Rights and Duties, 54
c. The Significance of the Three Characteristics, 55
3. SYNTHESIZING THE LAW, 57
I. Synthesizing Rules: General to Specific, 57
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A. The Basic Organizing Principle, 58
B. Relationships Among Rules, 58
1. Rules Defining an Element of a More General Rule, 58
2. Rules Applying a More General Rule, 59
3. Rules Limiting a More General Rule, 60
4. Rules Cumulative to Another Rule, 62
5. Rules Contradicting Another Rule, 63
c. Outlining the Synthesis, 65
n. Synthesizing a Rule: Specific to General, 67
A. The Basic Model, 68
B. The Problem ofIndeterminacy, 69
c. Addressing Indeterminacy Through Policy Judgments, 71
D. Using Rule Synthesis as an Advocate, 73
1. Supporting the New Rule, 73
2. Opposing the New Rule, 74
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4. RESEARCHING THE FACTS, 77
I. The Role of Factual Research, 77
II. The Rules of Factual Investigation, 78
A. The Law'ofEvidence, 79
1. Types of Evidence Admissible, 79
2. The Requirement of Relevance, 80
3. Reasons to Exclude Relevant Evidence, 81
a. Unreliability: The Example of Hearsay, 81
b. Prejudice: The Example ofPrior Bad Acts, 82
c. Other Policies: The Example ofPrivilege, S3 v
B. The Burden of Proof, 83
1. Types of Burdens of Proof, 84
2. Techniques to Persuade the Trier of Fact, 86
3. Presumptions, 87
c. The Problem of Cognitive Bias, 89
5. APPLYING THE LAW, 9I
I. Deduction, 93
A. The Basic Model, 93
B. The Problem of Indeterminacy, 95
c. Addressing Indeterminacy Through Specificity, 96
D. Addressing Indeterminacy Through Rules of Statutory
Interpretation, 97
1. The Special Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 97
2. The Indeterminacy of These Special Rules, 99
E. Addressing Indeterminacy Through Policy Judgments, 101
1. The Two Types of Policy Judgments Required, 101
2. The Nature of Policy Judgments, 102
3. Combining the Policy Judgments to Decide Cases, 103
a. In General, 103
b. Line Drawing, 104
c. Balancing, 105
F. The Special Problem of Dictum, 106
G. Using Deduction as an Advocate, 108
1. Supporting Application of the Rule, 109
2. Opposing Application of the Rule, 112
H. Addressing Indeterminacy Through Analogies, 115
II. Analogy, 115 /
A. The Basic Model, 115
B. The Problem of Indeterminacy, 117
c. Addressing Indeterminacy Through Policy Judgments, 118
D. The Special Problem of Dictum, 121
E. Using Analogy as an Advocate, 111
1. Arguments for Following the Precedent, 121
2. Arguments for Distinguishing the Precedent, 124
III. Comparing Deduction and Analogy, 127
IV. Deduction and Analogy in a Jury System , 128
V. Epilogue: Changing Case Law, 130
A. Flexibility Without Changing Case Law, 130
B. Justifications for Changing Case Law, I'iO
c. Techniques for Changing Case Law, 132
1. Confining a Case to Its Facts, 132
2. Overruling Sufe Si/enfio, 132
3. Creating Exceptions, 133
4. Employing Legal Fictions, 134
5. Explicit Overruling, 135
PART TWO
REASONING WITH POLICIES
6. POLICY ANALYSIS, SYNTHESIS, AND APPLICATION, I39
I. Policy Analysis, 140
A. The Dilemma of Choosing Among Opposed Policies, 140
B. Specific Policy Conflicts, 141
1. The Individual and the Community, 143
a. Individualism and Majoritarianism, 144
b. Autonomy and Paternalism, 146
c. Justice and Efficiency, 148
d. Rights Theory and Utilitarianism, 149
2. Naturalism and Positivism, 152
3. Instrumentalism and Formalism, 154
a. In General, 1S4 /
b. Application to Statutory Interpretation, 161
II., Policy Synthesis, 165
A. The Relationship in Theory Among Policies, 165
B. The Relationship in Consequence Amottg Policies, 170
1. Consistent Policies, 170
2. Opposed Policies, 171
3. Independent Policies, 172
III. Policy Application, 173
A. The Technique of Deciding, 172
B. The Indeterminacy of Policy Judgments, 174
c. Predicting the Decision of the Court, 178
7. CONTRACTS, 181
I. Traditional Contract, 181
A. Offer and Acceptance, 182
1. The Objective Test, 182
2. The Subjective Test, 183
B. Consideration, 184
II. Detrimental Reliance, 185
III. The Nature of the Contractual Duty, 187
A. The Duty to Perform the Express
Promise and Any Implied Promises, 187
B. Liabilityfor Breach of the Duty to Perform. 188
1. Breach of a Contractual Promise, 188
2. Loss by the Promisee, 189
3. Loss as a Consequence of the Breach, 191
8. TORTS, 195
I. The Nature of Tort Law, 195
11. The Structure of Modern Tort Law, 196
A. Intentional Tort, 196
B. Negligence, 198
1. Injury, 199
2. Causation, 200
3. Breach, 201
4. Duty, 203
c. Strict Liability, 203
9. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 20/
I. Constitutional Interpretation, 207
II. Powers of the Government: Federalism, 210
. III. Individual Rights, 214
A. Free Speech, 11$
B. Due Process, 216
10, CIVIL PROCEDURE, 221
I. Personal Jurisdiction, 222
A. Statutory Basis ofPersonal Jurisdiction, 222
B. Limitations Imposed by Due Process, 222
1. Traditional Bases of Personal Jurisdiction, 222
2. Minimum Contacts, 224
a. General Jurisdiction, 224
b. Specific Jurisdiction, 224
(1) Purposeful Availment, 225
(2) Reasonableness, 225
c. Jurisdictional Rules as a Compromise, 226
II. Subject Matter Jurisdiction, 228
A. Federal Question Jurisdiction, 229
B. Diversity Jurisdiction, 230
PART THREE
PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL REASONING
11. A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ON
LEGAL REASONING, 235
I. The Enlightenment Origins of American Legal Thought, 236
A. The Emergence ofEnlightenment Epistemology, 236
B. The Emergence ofLiberalism, 239
c. The Decline of Naturalism, 241
II. Legal Formalism, 242
III. The Critique of Legal Formalism, 245
A. The Methodological Critique, 24s
B. The Political Critique, 249
IV. Legal Realism, 250
V. Contemporary Mainstream Legal Reasoning, 255 ^
12. CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL
REASONING, 259
I. Law and Economics, 260
II. Critical Legal Studies, 266
III. Identity-Based Movements, 270
A. Feminist Legal Theory, 270
B. Critical Race Theory, 275
c. Other Identity-Based Movements, 277
IV. Liberalism, 279
V. Pragmatism, 281
VI. Conclusion, 285