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INTRODUCTION, 1<br/>I. How Lawyers Think, i<br/>II. 'The Plan of This Book, 4<br/>III. Thinking Like a Law Student, 6<br/>PART ONS<br/>BASIC LEGAL REASONING<br/>1. IDENTIFYING APPLICABLE LAW, 9<br/>I. The Sources of American Law, lo<br/>A. Enacted Law, ii<br/>1. The Legislative Process, 12<br/>2. The Administrative Process, 14<br/>B. Case Law, 15<br/>1. The District Court, 16<br/>a. Bringing a Dispute Before the Court, 16<br/>h. Identifying Issues, 20<br/>c. Deciding Issues, 21<br/>d. Distinguishing Between Issues of Law and Fact, 24<br/>2. The Court of Appeals, 25<br/>3. The Supreme Court, 27<br/>II. Identifying Applicable Law, 28<br/>A. Identifying the Government with Power:<br/>An Introduction to Choice of Law Theory, 28<br/>1. Vertical Choice of Law Analysis, 29<br/>2. Horizontal Choice of Law Analysis, 29<br/>B. Identifying Law by Subject Matter:<br/>An Introduction to Rule Analysis, 31<br/>1. The Nature of Rules: Form, 31<br/>2. The Nature of Rules: Substance, 32<br/>3. The Problem of Generality, 33<br/>c. Identifying Void Rules: An Introduction<br/>to Constitutionalism, 34 ,<br/>2, ANALYZING THE LAW, 37<br/>I. Analyzing Statutes, 37<br/>II. Analyzing Cases, 40<br/>A. The Components of a Case, 40<br/>1. Facts, 40<br/>2. Procedural History, 40<br/>3. Questions Presented, 41<br/>4. Rules of Law, 41<br/>5. Application of Law to Fact, 42<br/>6. Holding, 45<br/>7. Disposition, 47<br/>8. Dissents and Concurrences, 47<br/>B. An Introduction to Stare Decisis, 50<br/>III. Analyzing Rights and Duties, 53<br/>A. The Meaning of Right and Duty, 53<br/>B. Three Characteristics of Rights and Duties, 54<br/>c. The Significance of the Three Characteristics, 55<br/>3. SYNTHESIZING THE LAW, 57<br/>I. Synthesizing Rules: General to Specific, 57<br/>/<br/>A. The Basic Organizing Principle, 58<br/>B. Relationships Among Rules, 58<br/>1. Rules Defining an Element of a More General Rule, 58<br/>2. Rules Applying a More General Rule, 59<br/>3. Rules Limiting a More General Rule, 60<br/>4. Rules Cumulative to Another Rule, 62<br/>5. Rules Contradicting Another Rule, 63<br/>c. Outlining the Synthesis, 65<br/>n. Synthesizing a Rule: Specific to General, 67<br/>A. The Basic Model, 68<br/>B. The Problem ofIndeterminacy, 69<br/>c. Addressing Indeterminacy Through Policy Judgments, 71<br/>D. Using Rule Synthesis as an Advocate, 73<br/>1. Supporting the New Rule, 73<br/>2. Opposing the New Rule, 74<br/>/<br/>4. RESEARCHING THE FACTS, 77<br/>I. The Role of Factual Research, 77<br/>II. The Rules of Factual Investigation, 78<br/>A. The Law'ofEvidence, 79<br/>1. Types of Evidence Admissible, 79<br/>2. The Requirement of Relevance, 80<br/>3. Reasons to Exclude Relevant Evidence, 81<br/>a. Unreliability: The Example of Hearsay, 81<br/>b. Prejudice: The Example ofPrior Bad Acts, 82<br/>c. Other Policies: The Example ofPrivilege, S3 v<br/>B. The Burden of Proof, 83<br/>1. Types of Burdens of Proof, 84<br/>2. Techniques to Persuade the Trier of Fact, 86<br/>3. Presumptions, 87<br/>c. The Problem of Cognitive Bias, 89<br/>5. APPLYING THE LAW, 9I<br/>I. Deduction, 93<br/>A. The Basic Model, 93<br/>B. The Problem of Indeterminacy, 95<br/>c. Addressing Indeterminacy Through Specificity, 96<br/>D. Addressing Indeterminacy Through Rules of Statutory<br/>Interpretation, 97<br/>1. The Special Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 97<br/>2. The Indeterminacy of These Special Rules, 99<br/>E. Addressing Indeterminacy Through Policy Judgments, 101<br/>1. The Two Types of Policy Judgments Required, 101<br/>2. The Nature of Policy Judgments, 102<br/>3. Combining the Policy Judgments to Decide Cases, 103<br/>a. In General, 103<br/>b. Line Drawing, 104<br/>c. Balancing, 105<br/>F. The Special Problem of Dictum, 106<br/>G. Using Deduction as an Advocate, 108<br/>1. Supporting Application of the Rule, 109<br/>2. Opposing Application of the Rule, 112<br/>H. Addressing Indeterminacy Through Analogies, 115<br/>II. Analogy, 115 /<br/>A. The Basic Model, 115<br/>B. The Problem of Indeterminacy, 117<br/>c. Addressing Indeterminacy Through Policy Judgments, 118<br/>D. The Special Problem of Dictum, 121<br/>E. Using Analogy as an Advocate, 111<br/>1. Arguments for Following the Precedent, 121<br/>2. Arguments for Distinguishing the Precedent, 124<br/>III. Comparing Deduction and Analogy, 127<br/>IV. Deduction and Analogy in a Jury System , 128<br/>V. Epilogue: Changing Case Law, 130<br/>A. Flexibility Without Changing Case Law, 130<br/>B. Justifications for Changing Case Law, I'iO<br/>c. Techniques for Changing Case Law, 132<br/>1. Confining a Case to Its Facts, 132<br/>2. Overruling Sufe Si/enfio, 132<br/>3. Creating Exceptions, 133<br/>4. Employing Legal Fictions, 134<br/>5. Explicit Overruling, 135<br/>PART TWO<br/>REASONING WITH POLICIES<br/>6. POLICY ANALYSIS, SYNTHESIS, AND APPLICATION, I39<br/>I. Policy Analysis, 140<br/>A. The Dilemma of Choosing Among Opposed Policies, 140<br/>B. Specific Policy Conflicts, 141<br/>1. The Individual and the Community, 143<br/>a. Individualism and Majoritarianism, 144<br/>b. Autonomy and Paternalism, 146<br/>c. Justice and Efficiency, 148<br/>d. Rights Theory and Utilitarianism, 149<br/>2. Naturalism and Positivism, 152<br/>3. Instrumentalism and Formalism, 154<br/>a. In General, 1S4 /<br/>b. Application to Statutory Interpretation, 161<br/>II., Policy Synthesis, 165<br/>A. The Relationship in Theory Among Policies, 165<br/>B. The Relationship in Consequence Amottg Policies, 170<br/>1. Consistent Policies, 170<br/>2. Opposed Policies, 171<br/>3. Independent Policies, 172<br/>III. Policy Application, 173<br/>A. The Technique of Deciding, 172<br/>B. The Indeterminacy of Policy Judgments, 174<br/>c. Predicting the Decision of the Court, 178<br/>7. CONTRACTS, 181<br/>I. Traditional Contract, 181<br/>A. Offer and Acceptance, 182<br/>1. The Objective Test, 182<br/>2. The Subjective Test, 183<br/>B. Consideration, 184<br/>II. Detrimental Reliance, 185<br/>III. The Nature of the Contractual Duty, 187<br/>A. The Duty to Perform the Express<br/>Promise and Any Implied Promises, 187<br/>B. Liabilityfor Breach of the Duty to Perform. 188<br/>1. Breach of a Contractual Promise, 188<br/>2. Loss by the Promisee, 189<br/>3. Loss as a Consequence of the Breach, 191<br/>8. TORTS, 195<br/>I. The Nature of Tort Law, 195<br/>11. The Structure of Modern Tort Law, 196<br/>A. Intentional Tort, 196<br/>B. Negligence, 198<br/>1. Injury, 199<br/>2. Causation, 200<br/>3. Breach, 201<br/>4. Duty, 203<br/>c. Strict Liability, 203<br/>9. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 20/<br/>I. Constitutional Interpretation, 207<br/>II. Powers of the Government: Federalism, 210<br/>. III. Individual Rights, 214<br/>A. Free Speech, 11$<br/>B. Due Process, 216<br/>10, CIVIL PROCEDURE, 221<br/>I. Personal Jurisdiction, 222<br/>A. Statutory Basis ofPersonal Jurisdiction, 222<br/>B. Limitations Imposed by Due Process, 222<br/>1. Traditional Bases of Personal Jurisdiction, 222<br/>2. Minimum Contacts, 224<br/>a. General Jurisdiction, 224<br/>b. Specific Jurisdiction, 224<br/>(1) Purposeful Availment, 225<br/>(2) Reasonableness, 225<br/>c. Jurisdictional Rules as a Compromise, 226<br/>II. Subject Matter Jurisdiction, 228<br/>A. Federal Question Jurisdiction, 229<br/>B. Diversity Jurisdiction, 230<br/>PART THREE<br/>PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL REASONING<br/>11. A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ON<br/>LEGAL REASONING, 235<br/>I. The Enlightenment Origins of American Legal Thought, 236<br/>A. The Emergence ofEnlightenment Epistemology, 236<br/>B. The Emergence ofLiberalism, 239<br/>c. The Decline of Naturalism, 241<br/>II. Legal Formalism, 242<br/>III. The Critique of Legal Formalism, 245<br/>A. The Methodological Critique, 24s<br/>B. The Political Critique, 249<br/>IV. Legal Realism, 250<br/>V. Contemporary Mainstream Legal Reasoning, 255 ^<br/>12. CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL<br/>REASONING, 259<br/>I. Law and Economics, 260<br/>II. Critical Legal Studies, 266<br/>III. Identity-Based Movements, 270<br/>A. Feminist Legal Theory, 270<br/>B. Critical Race Theory, 275<br/>c. Other Identity-Based Movements, 277<br/>IV. Liberalism, 279<br/>V. Pragmatism, 281<br/>VI. Conclusion, 285 |
