The economic theory of auctions/ edited by Paul Klemperer

Contributor(s): Klemperer, Paul, edMaterial type: TextTextPublication details: Cheltenham: Elgar Pub., 2000Description: 2 v. : ill. ; 25 cmISBN: 1858988705; 9781858988702Subject(s): AuctionsDDC classification: 330.01
Contents:
Acknowledgements -- Foreword -- Part I. Introduction to the Papers -- 1. Auction Theory: A Guide to the Literature -- Part II. Early Literature -- 2. Counterspeculation, Auctions, and Competitive Sealed Tenders -- 3. Auction and Bidding Games -- 4. Toward a Study of Bidding Processes Part IV -- Games with Unknown Costs -- 5. 'A Note on Ortega Reicherts "A Sequential Game with Information Flow" -- 6. A Sequential Game with Information Flow -- 7. Competitive Bidding With Disparate Information -- Part III. Introduction to the Recent Literature -- 8. Auctions and Bidding -- 9. Auction Theory with Private Values -- Part IV. The Basic Analysis of Optimal Auctions, Revenue Equivalence, and Marginal Revenues -- 10. Optimal Auction Design -- 11. Optimal Auctions -- 12. The Simple Economics of Optimal Auctions -- Part V. Risk Aversion -- 13. Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers -- 14. 'Comparing Auctions for Risk Averse Buyers: A Buyers Point of View -- Part VI. Correlation and Affiliation -- 15. A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding -- 16. Optimal Selling Strategies Under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist When Demands are Interdependent -- 17. Optimal Reservation Prices in Auctions -- Part VII. Asymmetries -- A. Private Value Differences -- 18. Government Procurement and International Trade -- 19. Asymmetric Auctions -- B. Almost Common Values -- 20. Reputation in Repeated Second-Price Auctions -- 21. Auctions with Almost Common Values: The "Wallet Game" and its Applications -- C. Information Advantages -- 22. The Value of Information in a Sealed-Bid Auction -- Part VIII. Entry Costs and the Number of Bidders -- A. Endogenous Entry of Bidders -- 23. Equilibrium in Auctions with Entry -- 24. Optimal Auctions Revisited -- 25. Information Acquisition in Discriminatory Auctions -- 26. A Theory of Preemptive Takeover Bidding -- B. The Value of Additional Bidders -- 27. Auctions Versus Negotiations -- C. Information Aggregation with Large Numbers of Bidders -- 28. A Bidding Model of Perfect Competition -- 29. Rational Expectations, Information Acquisition, and Competitive Bidding -- Part IX. Collusion -- 30. Collusion and the Choice of Auction -- 31. Bidding Rings -- 32. Collusion in Auctions -- Name Index --
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Holdings
Item type Current library Call number Vol info Status Date due Barcode Item holds
General Books General Books Central Library, Sikkim University
General Book Section 		330.01 KLE/E (Browse shelf(Opens below)) v.1 Available P07574
Total holds: 0

Acknowledgements --
Foreword --
Part I. Introduction to the Papers --
1. Auction Theory: A Guide to the Literature --
Part II. Early Literature --
2. Counterspeculation, Auctions, and Competitive Sealed Tenders --
3. Auction and Bidding Games --
4. Toward a Study of Bidding Processes Part IV --
Games with Unknown Costs --
5. 'A Note on Ortega Reicherts "A Sequential Game with Information Flow" --
6. A Sequential Game with Information Flow --
7. Competitive Bidding With Disparate Information --
Part III. Introduction to the Recent Literature --
8. Auctions and Bidding --
9. Auction Theory with Private Values --
Part IV. The Basic Analysis of Optimal Auctions, Revenue Equivalence, and Marginal Revenues --
10. Optimal Auction Design --
11. Optimal Auctions --
12. The Simple Economics of Optimal Auctions --
Part V. Risk Aversion --
13. Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers --
14. 'Comparing Auctions for Risk Averse Buyers: A Buyers Point of View --
Part VI. Correlation and Affiliation --
15. A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding --
16. Optimal Selling Strategies Under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist When Demands are Interdependent --
17. Optimal Reservation Prices in Auctions --
Part VII. Asymmetries --
A. Private Value Differences --
18. Government Procurement and International Trade --
19. Asymmetric Auctions --
B. Almost Common Values --
20. Reputation in Repeated Second-Price Auctions --
21. Auctions with Almost Common Values: The "Wallet Game" and its Applications --
C. Information Advantages --
22. The Value of Information in a Sealed-Bid Auction --
Part VIII. Entry Costs and the Number of Bidders --
A. Endogenous Entry of Bidders --
23. Equilibrium in Auctions with Entry --
24. Optimal Auctions Revisited --
25. Information Acquisition in Discriminatory Auctions --
26. A Theory of Preemptive Takeover Bidding --
B. The Value of Additional Bidders --
27. Auctions Versus Negotiations --
C. Information Aggregation with Large Numbers of Bidders --
28. A Bidding Model of Perfect Competition --
29. Rational Expectations, Information Acquisition, and Competitive Bidding --
Part IX. Collusion --
30. Collusion and the Choice of Auction --
31. Bidding Rings --
32. Collusion in Auctions --
Name Index --

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