The economic theory of auctions/
The economic theory of auctions/
edited by Paul Klemperer
- Cheltenham: Elgar Pub., 2000.
- 2 v. : ill. ; 25 cm.
Acknowledgements --
Foreword --
Part I. Introduction to the Papers --
1. Auction Theory: A Guide to the Literature --
Part II. Early Literature --
2. Counterspeculation, Auctions, and Competitive Sealed Tenders --
3. Auction and Bidding Games --
4. Toward a Study of Bidding Processes Part IV --
Games with Unknown Costs --
5. 'A Note on Ortega Reicherts "A Sequential Game with Information Flow" --
6. A Sequential Game with Information Flow --
7. Competitive Bidding With Disparate Information --
Part III. Introduction to the Recent Literature --
8. Auctions and Bidding --
9. Auction Theory with Private Values --
Part IV. The Basic Analysis of Optimal Auctions, Revenue Equivalence, and Marginal Revenues --
10. Optimal Auction Design --
11. Optimal Auctions --
12. The Simple Economics of Optimal Auctions --
Part V. Risk Aversion --
13. Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers --
14. 'Comparing Auctions for Risk Averse Buyers: A Buyers Point of View --
Part VI. Correlation and Affiliation --
15. A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding --
16. Optimal Selling Strategies Under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist When Demands are Interdependent --
17. Optimal Reservation Prices in Auctions --
Part VII. Asymmetries --
A. Private Value Differences --
18. Government Procurement and International Trade --
19. Asymmetric Auctions --
B. Almost Common Values --
20. Reputation in Repeated Second-Price Auctions --
21. Auctions with Almost Common Values: The "Wallet Game" and its Applications --
C. Information Advantages --
22. The Value of Information in a Sealed-Bid Auction --
Part VIII. Entry Costs and the Number of Bidders --
A. Endogenous Entry of Bidders --
23. Equilibrium in Auctions with Entry --
24. Optimal Auctions Revisited --
25. Information Acquisition in Discriminatory Auctions --
26. A Theory of Preemptive Takeover Bidding --
B. The Value of Additional Bidders --
27. Auctions Versus Negotiations --
C. Information Aggregation with Large Numbers of Bidders --
28. A Bidding Model of Perfect Competition --
29. Rational Expectations, Information Acquisition, and Competitive Bidding --
Part IX. Collusion --
30. Collusion and the Choice of Auction --
31. Bidding Rings --
32. Collusion in Auctions --
Name Index --
1858988705 9781858988702
Auctions
330.01 / KLE/E
Acknowledgements --
Foreword --
Part I. Introduction to the Papers --
1. Auction Theory: A Guide to the Literature --
Part II. Early Literature --
2. Counterspeculation, Auctions, and Competitive Sealed Tenders --
3. Auction and Bidding Games --
4. Toward a Study of Bidding Processes Part IV --
Games with Unknown Costs --
5. 'A Note on Ortega Reicherts "A Sequential Game with Information Flow" --
6. A Sequential Game with Information Flow --
7. Competitive Bidding With Disparate Information --
Part III. Introduction to the Recent Literature --
8. Auctions and Bidding --
9. Auction Theory with Private Values --
Part IV. The Basic Analysis of Optimal Auctions, Revenue Equivalence, and Marginal Revenues --
10. Optimal Auction Design --
11. Optimal Auctions --
12. The Simple Economics of Optimal Auctions --
Part V. Risk Aversion --
13. Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers --
14. 'Comparing Auctions for Risk Averse Buyers: A Buyers Point of View --
Part VI. Correlation and Affiliation --
15. A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding --
16. Optimal Selling Strategies Under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist When Demands are Interdependent --
17. Optimal Reservation Prices in Auctions --
Part VII. Asymmetries --
A. Private Value Differences --
18. Government Procurement and International Trade --
19. Asymmetric Auctions --
B. Almost Common Values --
20. Reputation in Repeated Second-Price Auctions --
21. Auctions with Almost Common Values: The "Wallet Game" and its Applications --
C. Information Advantages --
22. The Value of Information in a Sealed-Bid Auction --
Part VIII. Entry Costs and the Number of Bidders --
A. Endogenous Entry of Bidders --
23. Equilibrium in Auctions with Entry --
24. Optimal Auctions Revisited --
25. Information Acquisition in Discriminatory Auctions --
26. A Theory of Preemptive Takeover Bidding --
B. The Value of Additional Bidders --
27. Auctions Versus Negotiations --
C. Information Aggregation with Large Numbers of Bidders --
28. A Bidding Model of Perfect Competition --
29. Rational Expectations, Information Acquisition, and Competitive Bidding --
Part IX. Collusion --
30. Collusion and the Choice of Auction --
31. Bidding Rings --
32. Collusion in Auctions --
Name Index --
1858988705 9781858988702
Auctions
330.01 / KLE/E