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Introduction: a sketch of the sources and nature of belief,<br/>justification, and knowledge<br/>Perception, belief, and justification<br/>Justification as process, as status, and as property<br/>Knowledge and justification<br/>Memory, introspection, and self-consciousness<br/>Reason and rational reflection<br/>Testimony<br/>Basic sources of belief, justification, and knowledge<br/>Three kinds of grounds of belief<br/>Fallibility and skepticism<br/>Overview<br/>Part One<br/>Sources of justification, knowledge, and truth<br/>I Perception: sensing, believing, and knowing<br/>The elements and basic kinds of perception<br/>Seeing and believing<br/>Perceptuai justification and perceptual knowledge<br/>Notes<br/>2 Theories of perception: sense experience,<br/>appearances, and reaiity<br/>Some commonsense views of perception<br/>The theory of appearing<br/>Sense-datum theories of perception<br/>Adverbial theories of perception<br/>Adverbial and sense-datum theories of sensory experience<br/>Phenomenalism<br/>Perception and the senses<br/>Notes<br/>3 Memory: the preservation and reconstruction of<br/>the past<br/>Memory and the past<br/>The causal basis of memory beliefs<br/>Theories of memory<br/>Remembering, recalling, and imaging<br/>Remembering, imaging, and recognition<br/>The epistemological centrality of memory<br/>Notes<br/>4 Consciousness: the life of the mind<br/>Two basic kinds of mental properties<br/>Introspection and inward vision<br/>Some theories of introspective consciousness<br/>Consciousness and privileged access<br/>Introspective consciousness as a source of justification and knowledge<br/>Notes<br/>5 Reason I: understanding, insight, and inteliectual<br/>power<br/>Self-evident truths of reason<br/>The classical view of the truths of reason<br/>The empiricist view of the truths of reason<br/>Notes<br/>6 Reason II: meaning, necessity, and provability<br/>The conventionalist view of the truths of reason<br/>Some difficulties and strengths of the classical view<br/>Reason, experience, and a priori justification<br/>Notes<br/>7 Testimony: the social foundation of knowledge<br/>The nature of testimony: formal and informal<br/>The psychology of testimony<br/>The epistemology of testimony<br/>The indispensability of testimonial grounds<br/>Notes<br/>Part Two<br/>The structure and growth of justification and<br/>knowledge<br/>8 Inference and the extension of knowledge<br/>The process, content, and structure of inference<br/>Inference and the growth of knowledge<br/>Source conditions and transmission conditions for inferential knowledge<br/>and justification<br/>Memorial preservation of inferential Justification and inferential<br/>knowledge<br/>Notes<br/>9 The architecture of knowledge<br/>Inferential chains and the structure of belief<br/>The epistemic regress problem<br/>The epistemic regress argument<br/>Foundationalism and coherentism<br/>Holistic coherentism<br/>The nature of coherence<br/>Coherence and second-order justification<br/>Moderate foundationalism<br/>Notes<br/>Part Three<br/>The nature and scope of justification and knowledge<br/>10 The analysis of knowledge: justification, certainty,<br/>and reliability<br/>Knowledge and justified true belief<br/>Knowledge conceived as the right kind of justified true belief<br/>Naturalistic accounts of the concept of knowledge<br/>Problems for reliability theories<br/>Notes<br/>11 Knowledge, justification, and truth: internalism,<br/>externalism, and intellectual virtue<br/>Knowledge and justification<br/>Internalism and externalism in epistemology<br/>Internalist and externalist versions of virtue epistemology<br/>Justification, knowledge, and truth<br/>The value problem<br/>Theories of truth<br/>Concluding proposals<br/>Notes<br/>12 Scientific, moral, and religious knowledge<br/>Scientific knowledge<br/>Moral knowledge<br/>Religious knowledge<br/>Notes<br/>13 Skepticism I: the quest for certainty<br/>The possibility of pervasive error<br/>Skepticism generalized<br/>The egocentric predicament<br/>Fallibility<br/>Uncertainty<br/>Notes<br/>14 Skepticism 11: the defense of common sense in the<br/>face of fallibility<br/>Negative versus positive defenses of common sense<br/>Deducibility, providential transmission, and induction<br/>The authority of knowledge and the cogency of its grounds<br/>Refutation and rebuttal<br/>Prospects for a positive defense of common sense<br/>The challenge of rational disagreement<br/>Skepticism and common sense<br/>Notes |
