000 02948nam a2200145Ia 4500
020 _a9780262112611
040 _cCUS
082 _a150.1
_bKUK/
100 _aKukla, Andre
245 0 _aMethods of theoritical psychology/
_c Andre Kukla
260 _aLondon:
_bMIT press,
_c2001.
300 _a250 p.
505 _aThe Enterprise of Theoretical Psychology 1.1 Theoretical Psychology Defined 1.2 Empiricism and Rationalism in the History of Psychology 1.3 Plan of the Book Basic Tools 2.1 Primitive Terms 2.2 Sets 2.3 Sentences and Terms 2.4 Propositions and Concepts 2.5 Necessary and Contingent Propositions 2.6 Logical Relations among Propositions 2.7 Deductive Arguments in Propositional Logic 2.8 Conditional and Indirect Proof 2.9 Deductive Arguments in Quantifier Logic Theories and Data 3.1 Data 3.2 Laws of Nature 3.3 Theoretical Terms, Theoretical Statements, and Theories 3.4 The Instrumentalist Account of Theoretical Entities 3.5 The Realist Account of Theoretical Entities Constructing and Evaluating Theories 4.1 The Construction of Scientific Theories 4.2 The Interplay between Theory Construction and Theory Evaluation 4.3 Truth 4.4 Generality 4.5 Other Theoretical Virtues Deriving and Testing Empirical Hypotheses 5.1 The Varieties of Empirical Projects 5.2 Empirical Confirmation: The Hypothetico-Deductive Account 83 5.3 Empirical Confirmation: The Bayesian Account 5.4 Empirical Disconfirmation 5.5 The Cycle of Empirical Testing and Theoretical Accommodation 5.6 Prediction as a Theoretical Activity 5.7 Weak AI as a Style of Theoretical Psychology Theoretical Amplification 6.1 Amplification Defined 6.2 Internal Inconsistency 6.3 Intertheoretical Entailment 6.4 Intertheoretical Inconsistency 6.5 Intertheoretical Complementarity 6.6 Independence Arguments 6.7 Theoretical Confirmation (Postdiction) 6.8 Consistency Arguments 6.9 Theoretical Disconfirmation Theoretical Simplification 7.1 Theoretical Preference 7.2 Syntactic Simplicity 7.3 Rc-Simplicity 7.4 Rm-Simplicity 7.5 Metaphysical Simplicity 7.6 Epistemic Simplicity 7.7 Two Types of Simplification 7.8 The Structure of Theoretical Reduction 7.9 TheoreticalUnification 165 Necessary Propositions 8.1 Distinguishing Necessary from Contingent Prepositions 8.2 The Too-Strong Argument for Innateness: A Detailed Case Study 8.3 Discovering New Necessary Truths 8.4 Strong AI 9 Conceptual Issues 9.1 The Construction of Conceptual Schemes 9.2 Russell's Paradox 9.3 Conceptual Innovation 9.4 How Not to Evaluate Conceptual Schemes 9.5 Minor Criteria for Conceptual Evaluation 9.6 Expressive Power 9.7 Instant Accrual of Data 9.8 Creation of Data 10 The Contingent A Priori 10.1 The Need for Presuppositions 10.2 Grounded Presuppositions 10.3 Underground Presuppositions 10.4 Discovery and Evaluation of Underground Presuppositions 10.5 Grounded Presuppositions in Psychology
942 _cWB16
999 _c155976
_d155976