000			02948nam a2200145Ia 4500
020			_a9780262112611
040			_cCUS
082			_a150.1 _bKUK/
100			_aKukla, Andre
245		0	_aMethods of theoritical psychology/ _c Andre Kukla
260			_aLondon: _bMIT press, _c2001.
300			_a250 p.
505			_aThe Enterprise of Theoretical Psychology 1.1 Theoretical Psychology Defined 1.2 Empiricism and Rationalism in the History of Psychology 1.3 Plan of the Book Basic Tools 2.1 Primitive Terms 2.2 Sets 2.3 Sentences and Terms 2.4 Propositions and Concepts 2.5 Necessary and Contingent Propositions 2.6 Logical Relations among Propositions 2.7 Deductive Arguments in Propositional Logic 2.8 Conditional and Indirect Proof 2.9 Deductive Arguments in Quantifier Logic Theories and Data 3.1 Data 3.2 Laws of Nature 3.3 Theoretical Terms, Theoretical Statements, and Theories 3.4 The Instrumentalist Account of Theoretical Entities 3.5 The Realist Account of Theoretical Entities Constructing and Evaluating Theories 4.1 The Construction of Scientific Theories 4.2 The Interplay between Theory Construction and Theory Evaluation 4.3 Truth 4.4 Generality 4.5 Other Theoretical Virtues Deriving and Testing Empirical Hypotheses 5.1 The Varieties of Empirical Projects 5.2 Empirical Confirmation: The Hypothetico-Deductive Account 83 5.3 Empirical Confirmation: The Bayesian Account 5.4 Empirical Disconfirmation 5.5 The Cycle of Empirical Testing and Theoretical Accommodation 5.6 Prediction as a Theoretical Activity 5.7 Weak AI as a Style of Theoretical Psychology Theoretical Amplification 6.1 Amplification Defined 6.2 Internal Inconsistency 6.3 Intertheoretical Entailment 6.4 Intertheoretical Inconsistency 6.5 Intertheoretical Complementarity 6.6 Independence Arguments 6.7 Theoretical Confirmation (Postdiction) 6.8 Consistency Arguments 6.9 Theoretical Disconfirmation Theoretical Simplification 7.1 Theoretical Preference 7.2 Syntactic Simplicity 7.3 Rc-Simplicity 7.4 Rm-Simplicity 7.5 Metaphysical Simplicity 7.6 Epistemic Simplicity 7.7 Two Types of Simplification 7.8 The Structure of Theoretical Reduction 7.9 TheoreticalUnification 165 Necessary Propositions 8.1 Distinguishing Necessary from Contingent Prepositions 8.2 The Too-Strong Argument for Innateness: A Detailed Case Study 8.3 Discovering New Necessary Truths 8.4 Strong AI 9 Conceptual Issues 9.1 The Construction of Conceptual Schemes 9.2 Russell's Paradox 9.3 Conceptual Innovation 9.4 How Not to Evaluate Conceptual Schemes 9.5 Minor Criteria for Conceptual Evaluation 9.6 Expressive Power 9.7 Instant Accrual of Data 9.8 Creation of Data 10 The Contingent A Priori 10.1 The Need for Presuppositions 10.2 Grounded Presuppositions 10.3 Underground Presuppositions 10.4 Discovery and Evaluation of Underground Presuppositions 10.5 Grounded Presuppositions in Psychology
942			_cWB16
999			_c155976 _d155976