000			00330nam a2200133Ia 4500
999			_c152793 _d152793
020			_a1858988705
020			_a9781858988702
040			_cCUS
082			_a330.01 _bKLE/E
245		4	_aThe economic theory of auctions/ _cedited by Paul Klemperer
260			_bElgar Pub., _c2000. _aCheltenham:
300			_a2 v. : _bill. ; _c25 cm.
505			_aAcknowledgements -- Foreword -- Part I. Introduction to the Papers -- 1. Auction Theory: A Guide to the Literature -- Part II. Early Literature -- 2. Counterspeculation, Auctions, and Competitive Sealed Tenders -- 3. Auction and Bidding Games -- 4. Toward a Study of Bidding Processes Part IV -- Games with Unknown Costs -- 5. 'A Note on Ortega Reicherts "A Sequential Game with Information Flow" -- 6. A Sequential Game with Information Flow -- 7. Competitive Bidding With Disparate Information -- Part III. Introduction to the Recent Literature -- 8. Auctions and Bidding -- 9. Auction Theory with Private Values -- Part IV. The Basic Analysis of Optimal Auctions, Revenue Equivalence, and Marginal Revenues -- 10. Optimal Auction Design -- 11. Optimal Auctions -- 12. The Simple Economics of Optimal Auctions -- Part V. Risk Aversion -- 13. Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers -- 14. 'Comparing Auctions for Risk Averse Buyers: A Buyers Point of View -- Part VI. Correlation and Affiliation -- 15. A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding -- 16. Optimal Selling Strategies Under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist When Demands are Interdependent -- 17. Optimal Reservation Prices in Auctions -- Part VII. Asymmetries -- A. Private Value Differences -- 18. Government Procurement and International Trade -- 19. Asymmetric Auctions -- B. Almost Common Values -- 20. Reputation in Repeated Second-Price Auctions -- 21. Auctions with Almost Common Values: The "Wallet Game" and its Applications -- C. Information Advantages -- 22. The Value of Information in a Sealed-Bid Auction -- Part VIII. Entry Costs and the Number of Bidders -- A. Endogenous Entry of Bidders -- 23. Equilibrium in Auctions with Entry -- 24. Optimal Auctions Revisited -- 25. Information Acquisition in Discriminatory Auctions -- 26. A Theory of Preemptive Takeover Bidding -- B. The Value of Additional Bidders -- 27. Auctions Versus Negotiations -- C. Information Aggregation with Large Numbers of Bidders -- 28. A Bidding Model of Perfect Competition -- 29. Rational Expectations, Information Acquisition, and Competitive Bidding -- Part IX. Collusion -- 30. Collusion and the Choice of Auction -- 31. Bidding Rings -- 32. Collusion in Auctions -- Name Index --
650			_aAuctions
700			_aKlemperer, Paul, ed.
942			_cWB16