000 00363nam a2200133Ia 4500
999 _c148633
_d148633
020 _a9780198294245
040 _cCUS
082 _a330
_bLAF/I
100 _aLaffout, Jean-Jacques
245 0 _aIncentives and political economy/
_cJean-Jacques Laffont
260 _aNew York:
_bOxford University Press,
_c2000.
300 _axii, 257 p. :
_bill. ;
_c23 cm.
440 _a(Clarendon lectures in economics)
505 _aPolitical Economy with a Benevolent Monarch -- The Design of Democratic Institutions -- Political Economy in Democratic Countries -- The Chicago View of Interest Group Politics -- The Complete Contracting Approach -- The Incomplete Contracting Approach -- Adding Asymmetric Information -- Endogenous Coalition Formation -- Politicians as Informed Supervisors -- The Complete Contract Approach to Constitutional Design -- A Simple Supervision Model -- The Optimal Constitution Without Supervision -- The Supervision Technology -- Optimal Incentives for the Politician -- Optimal Collusion-proof Constitution -- Equilibrium Collusion -- An Incentive Theory of the Separation of Powers -- Separation of Powers and Yardstick Competition -- A Model with Three Types -- Single Non-benevolent Politician -- Separation of Politicians -- Collusion-proof Constraints -- Optimal Constitution under Separation -- Comparative Statics: Rent and Welfare -- Generalization of the Results -- Prudent Behavior and Various Preferences -- Discriminatory Side-contracting Offers -- Collusion Between the Politicians -- Checks and Balances -- The Model -- Optimal Symmetric Constitution -- Supervision and Division of Tasks -- Multidimensional Collusion Activities -- A Model with Three Politicians -- Optimal Supervisory Structures -- Flexibility Versus Discretion in Constitutional Design -- Political Economy and Industrial Policy -- Political Interference in the Rent-Efficiency Trade-off -- Ownership Matters -- Incentives against Capture as a Constitutional Rule.
650 _aCommercial policy
650 _aEconomic policy
650 _aIndustrial policy
650 _aIncentives in industry
650 _aIndustrial promotion
650 _aEconomics
942 _cWB16