Rational choice politics/ edited by Torun Dewan, Keith M Dowding and Kenneth A Shepsle

VOLUME 4: BUREAUCRACY, CONSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS AND THE STATE Part 7: Bureaucracy Agency Budgets, Cost Information, and Auditing - Jeffrey S. Banks Bureaucratic Expertise versus Legislative Authority: A model of deception and monitoring in budgeting - Jonathan Bendor, Serge Taylor and Roland Van Gaalen Delegation and the Structure of Policy-Making: A transactions cost politics approach - David Epstein and Sharyn O'Halloran Congressional Influence on Bureaucracy - John Ferejohn and Charles Shipan Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control - Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll and Barry R. Weingast Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police patrols versus fire alarms - Mathew D. McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz Part 8: Constitutional Arrangements The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-preserving federalism and economic development - Barry R. Weingast A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures - Charles M. Tiebout An Economic Theory of Clubs - James M. Buchanan The Politician and the Judge: Accountability in government - Eric Maskin and Jean Tirole Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto players and presidentialism, parliamentarism, multi-cameralism, and multipartism - George Tsebelis Part 9: The State Dictatorship, Democracy and Development - Mancur Olson Constitutions and Commitment: The evolution of institutions governing public choice in seventeenth century england - Douglas C. North and Barry R. Weingast Coordination, Commitment and Enforcement: The case of the merchant guild - Avner Greif, Paul Milgrom and Barry R. Weingast A Rational Theory of the Size of Government - Allan H. Meltzer and Scott F. Richard Comparative Politics and Public Finance - Torsten Persson, Gerard Roland and Guido Tabellini A Theory of Political Transitions - Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson