TY  - BOOK
AU  - Laffout, Jean-Jacques
TI  - Incentives and political economy
SN  - 9780198294245
U1  - 330 
PY  - 2000///
CY  - New York
PB  - Oxford University Press
KW  - Commercial policy
KW  - Economic policy
KW  - Industrial policy
KW  - Incentives in industry
KW  - Industrial promotion
KW  - Economics
N1  - Political Economy with a Benevolent Monarch --
The Design of Democratic Institutions --
Political Economy in Democratic Countries --
The Chicago View of Interest Group Politics --
The Complete Contracting Approach --
The Incomplete Contracting Approach --
Adding Asymmetric Information --
Endogenous Coalition Formation --
Politicians as Informed Supervisors --
The Complete Contract Approach to Constitutional Design --
A Simple Supervision Model --
The Optimal Constitution Without Supervision --
The Supervision Technology --
Optimal Incentives for the Politician --
Optimal Collusion-proof Constitution --
Equilibrium Collusion --
An Incentive Theory of the Separation of Powers --
Separation of Powers and Yardstick Competition --
A Model with Three Types --
Single Non-benevolent Politician --
Separation of Politicians --
Collusion-proof Constraints --
Optimal Constitution under Separation --
Comparative Statics: Rent and Welfare --
Generalization of the Results --
Prudent Behavior and Various Preferences --
Discriminatory Side-contracting Offers --
Collusion Between the Politicians --
Checks and Balances --
The Model --
Optimal Symmetric Constitution --
Supervision and Division of Tasks --
Multidimensional Collusion Activities --
A Model with Three Politicians --
Optimal Supervisory Structures --
Flexibility Versus Discretion in Constitutional Design --
Political Economy and Industrial Policy --
Political Interference in the Rent-Efficiency Trade-off --
Ownership Matters --
Incentives against Capture as a Constitutional Rule
ER  -