Bertrand russell and the edwardian philosopher: constructing the world/ Omar Nasim

Acknowledgements;
Foreword;
Introduction;

1 Stout's Proto-New-Realism; I: Presentations;

1.1 Situating G.F. Stout;

1.2 Stout's doctrine of primary and secondary qualities;

1.3 Stout and the Brentano school;

1.4 Representative function of presentations;

1.5 Sensible space and real space;

1.6 Cook Wilson's geometrical counter-example; II: Ideal Constructions;

1.7 Stout's central question;

1.8 Ideal constructions;

2 British New Realism: The Language of Madness;

2.1 Stout's criticisms of Alexander;

2.2 Alexander's response.

2.2.1 The nature of sensations, images and other presentations

2.2.2 What is the metaphysical problem?;

2.2.3 'How can the interpretation which is supplied by the mind be a constituent of the [physical] object?';

2.3 Some general remarks;

3 British New Realism: The Language of Common-Sense;

3.1 T.P. Nunn and the New Realism;

3.2 Nunn and things;

3.3 Nunn's Postulate;

4 Russell and the Nature of Sense-Data;

4.1 Russell and Stout on sensible objects;

4.2 Russell, sense-data and sensibilia;

5 The Methods of Construction;

5.1 Russell's constructions and Nunn's Postulate.


5.2 Constructions, psychology and the essence of philosophy

6 The Method of Logical Construction;

6.1 A mathematical development;

6.2 The principle of abstraction; Conclusion; Notes; Bibliography; Index; A; B; C; D; E; F; G; H; I; J; K; L; M; N; O; P; R; S; T; V; W.