Divine Motivation Theory/ Zagzebski,Linda Trinkaus

Material type: TextTextPublication details: Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004Edition: 0Description: 410ISBN: 052153576XDDC classification: 241
Contents:
Part 1. Motivation-based virtue ethics 1. Constructing an ethical theory I. Value concepts and the metaphysics of value II. Three puzzles to solve III. Some confusions 1 wish to avoid IV. A taxonomy of ethical theories V. Exemplarism 2. Making emotion primary I. Starting with exemplars II. What an emotion is III. Emotion and value judgment IV. The intrinsic value of emotion V. Conclusion 3. Goods and virtues I. The good of ends and outcomes II. The good of pleasure III. The good for human persons IV. Virtues V. Defining the kinds of good VI. Conclusion 4. Acts and obligation I. Acts and the exemplar II. Obligation III. Defining the concepts of act evaluation IV. Moral judgment Conclusion to Part I Part 11. Divine Motivation theory 5. The virtues of God I. A brief history of the imitatio Dei II. The personhood of God III. The emotions and virtues of God rV. The motives of God and the Creation V. The metaphysical source of value 6. The moral importance of the Incarnation I. Must Christianity be an ethic of law? II. The Incarnation as an ethical doctrine III. The imitation of Christ and narrative ethics IV. Divine Motivation theory and Divine Command theory compared 7. The paradoxes of perfect goodness I. Three puzzles of perfect goodness II. The solution of Divine Command theory III. The solution of Divine Motivation theory IV. Does God have a will? V. Is the ability to sin a power? VI. Love and freedom VII. Conclusion 8. The problem of evil I. The intellectual problem of evil II. Divine Motivation theory and theodicy III. Objections and replies IV. The problem of suffering Conclusion to Part II Part III. Ethical pluralism 9. Ideal observers, ideal agents, and moral diversity I. The problem of moral disagreement II. Ideal observers III. Ideal agents IV. Rationality in the second person: Revising the self V. Religion and the task of developing a common morality
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Holdings
Item type Current library Call number Status Date due Barcode Item holds
General Books General Books Central Library, Sikkim University
General Book Section
241 ZAG/D (Browse shelf(Opens below)) Available P32975
Total holds: 0

Part 1. Motivation-based virtue ethics
1. Constructing an ethical theory
I. Value concepts and the metaphysics of value
II. Three puzzles to solve
III. Some confusions 1 wish to avoid
IV. A taxonomy of ethical theories
V. Exemplarism
2. Making emotion primary
I. Starting with exemplars
II. What an emotion is
III. Emotion and value judgment
IV. The intrinsic value of emotion
V. Conclusion
3. Goods and virtues
I. The good of ends and outcomes
II. The good of pleasure
III. The good for human persons
IV. Virtues
V. Defining the kinds of good
VI. Conclusion
4. Acts and obligation
I. Acts and the exemplar
II. Obligation
III. Defining the concepts of act evaluation
IV. Moral judgment
Conclusion to Part I
Part 11. Divine Motivation theory
5. The virtues of God
I. A brief history of the imitatio Dei
II. The personhood of God
III. The emotions and virtues of God
rV. The motives of God and the Creation
V. The metaphysical source of value
6. The moral importance of the Incarnation
I. Must Christianity be an ethic of law?
II. The Incarnation as an ethical doctrine
III. The imitation of Christ and narrative ethics
IV. Divine Motivation theory and Divine
Command theory compared
7. The paradoxes of perfect goodness
I. Three puzzles of perfect goodness
II. The solution of Divine Command theory
III. The solution of Divine Motivation theory
IV. Does God have a will?
V. Is the ability to sin a power?
VI. Love and freedom
VII. Conclusion
8. The problem of evil
I. The intellectual problem of evil
II. Divine Motivation theory and theodicy
III. Objections and replies
IV. The problem of suffering
Conclusion to Part II
Part III. Ethical pluralism
9. Ideal observers, ideal agents, and moral diversity
I. The problem of moral disagreement
II. Ideal observers
III. Ideal agents
IV. Rationality in the second person: Revising
the self
V. Religion and the task of developing a common
morality

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