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Rules and reason: perspectives on constitutional political economy edited by Ram Mudambi, Pietro Navarra and Giuseppe Sobbrio

Contributor(s): Navarra, Pietro ed | Mudamb, Ram ed | Sobbrio, Giuseppe edMaterial type: Text

TextPublication details: Cambridge: Cambridge University press, 2010Description: 320 pISBN: 0521659590Subject(s): Diritto costituzionale -- Fattori economici | FEDERALISMODDC classification: 338.9

Contents:

Foreword / James M. Buchanan -- Constitutional issues in modern democracies / Ram Mudambi, Pietro Navarra, and Giuseppe Sobbrio -- On writing a constitution / Dennis C. Mueller -- Constitutional order and economic evolution: competitive and protectionist interests in democratic Society / Viktor Vanberg -- The efficacy of arbitrary rules / James M. Buchanan and Yong J. Yoon -- Constitutional political economy and civil society / Charles K. Rowley -- The constitutional conflict between protecting expectations and moral evolution / Nicolaus Tideman -- Ideological competition and institutions: why cultural explanations of development patterns are not nonsense / Michael J. Ensley and Michael C. Munger -- Electoral systems and the art of constitutional engineering: an inventory of the main findings / Bernard N. Grofman and Andrew Reynolds -- Ordinary elections and constitutional arrangements / Pierre Salmon -- The cost imposed on political coalitions by constituent parties: the case of italian national elections / Ram Mudambi, Pietro Navarra, and Giuseppe Sobbrio -- A model of two-party campaigns in pluralistic elections with evidence / Chris W. Paul II and Allen W. Wilhite -- Ensuring a stable federal state: economics or political institutional design / Mikhail Filippov, Peter C. Ordeshook, and Olga V. Shvetsova -- A proposal for dynamic European Federalism: FOJC / Bruno S. Frey and Reiner Eichenberger -- The Maastricht excessive deficit rules and creative accounting / Francesco Forte -- Subsidiarity, federalism, and direct democracy as basic elements of a federal European constitution: some ideas using constitutional economics / Friedrich Schneider and Alexander F. Wagner.

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Holdings ( 1 )
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Holdings
Item type	Current library	Call number	Status	Date due	Barcode	Item holds
General Books	Central Library, Sikkim University General Book Section	338.9 MUD/R (Browse shelf(Opens below))	Available		P17650

Total holds: 0

Foreword / James M. Buchanan --
Constitutional issues in modern democracies / Ram Mudambi, Pietro Navarra, and Giuseppe Sobbrio --
On writing a constitution / Dennis C. Mueller --
Constitutional order and economic evolution: competitive and protectionist interests in democratic Society / Viktor Vanberg --
The efficacy of arbitrary rules / James M. Buchanan and Yong J. Yoon --
Constitutional political economy and civil society / Charles K. Rowley --
The constitutional conflict between protecting expectations and moral evolution / Nicolaus Tideman --
Ideological competition and institutions: why cultural explanations of development patterns are not nonsense / Michael J. Ensley and Michael C. Munger --
Electoral systems and the art of constitutional engineering: an inventory of the main findings / Bernard N. Grofman and Andrew Reynolds --
Ordinary elections and constitutional arrangements / Pierre Salmon --
The cost imposed on political coalitions by constituent parties: the case of italian national elections / Ram Mudambi, Pietro Navarra, and Giuseppe Sobbrio --
A model of two-party campaigns in pluralistic elections with evidence / Chris W. Paul II and Allen W. Wilhite --
Ensuring a stable federal state: economics or political institutional design / Mikhail Filippov, Peter C. Ordeshook, and Olga V. Shvetsova --
A proposal for dynamic European Federalism: FOJC / Bruno S. Frey and Reiner Eichenberger --
The Maastricht excessive deficit rules and creative accounting / Francesco Forte --
Subsidiarity, federalism, and direct democracy as basic elements of a federal European constitution: some ideas using constitutional economics / Friedrich Schneider and Alexander F. Wagner.

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