Bargaining and the theory of cooperative games: John Nash and beyond/ John Nash, Edited by William Thomson

Contents:AcknowledgementsIntroduction William ThomsonPART I BASIC PAPERS A Independence1. John F. Nash Jr. (1950), `The Bargaining Problem'2. Alvin E. Roth (1977), `Individual Rationality and Nash's Solution to the Bargaining Problem'3. Alvin E. Roth (1977), `Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives, and Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem'4. Hans Peters and Peter Wakker (1991), `Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives and Revealed Group Preferences'5. Charles Blackorby, Walter Bossert and David Donaldson (1994), `Generalized Ginis and Cooperative Bargaining Solutions'6. Efe A. Ok (1998), `Inequality Averse Collective Choice'B Monotonicity7. Ehud Kalai and Meir Smorodinsky (1975), `Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem'8. A.E. Roth (1979), `An Impossibility Result Concerning n-Person Bargaining Games'9. Ehud Kalai (1977), `Proportional Solutions to Bargaining Situations: Interpersonal Utility Comparisons'10. Haruo Imai (1983), `Individual Monotonicity and Lexicographic Maxmin Solution'11. W. Thomson and R.B. Myerson (1980), `Monotonicity and Independence Axioms'12. P.L. Yu (1973), `A Class of Solutions for Group Decision Problems'13. Youngsub Chun (1988), `The Equal-Loss Principle for Bargaining Problems'C Axioms Pertaining to Operations Performed on Feasible Sets14. Roger B. Myerson (1977), `Two-Person Bargaining Problems and Comparable Utility'15. M.A. Perles and M. Maschler (1981), `The Super-Additive Solution for the Nash Bargaining Game'16. Roger B. Myerson (1981), `Utilitarianism, Egalitarianism, and the Timing Effect in Social Choice Problems'17. Clara Ponsati and Joel Watson (1997), `Multiple-Issue Bargaining and Axiomatic Solutions'18. Hans Peters (1986), `Simultaneity of Issues and Additivity in Bargaining'D Ordinal Invariance19. Lloyd S. Shapley (1969), `Utility Comparison and the Theory of Games'20. Lars Tyge Nielsen (1983), `Ordinal Interpersonal Comparisons in Bargaining'21. Yves Sprumont (2000), `A Note on Ordinally Equivalent Pareto Surfaces'22. Zvi Safra and Dov Samet (2004), `An Ordinal Solution to Bargaining Problems with Many Players'E Non-convex Problems23. John P. Conley and Simon Wilkie (1991), `The Bargaining Problem Without Convexity: Extending the Egalitarian and Kalai-Smorodinksy Solutions'24. Lin Zhou (1997), `The Nash Bargaining Theory with Non-Convex Problems'PART II UNDERSTANDING THE ROLE OF THE DISAGREEMENT POINT A Monotonocity25. William Thomson (1987), `Monotonicity of Bargaining Solutions with Respect to the Disagreement Point'B Axioms Pertaining to Operations Performed on Disagreement Points26. Hans Peters and Eric van Damme (1991), `Characterizing the Nash and Raiffa Bargaining Solutions by Disagreement Point Axioms'27. Youngsub Chun and William Thomson (1990), `Bargaining with Uncertain Disagreement Points'PART III VARIABLE POPULATION OF AGENTS A Population Monotonicity28. William Thomson (1983), `The Fair Division of a Fixed Supply Among a Growing Population'29. William Thomson (1983), `Problems of Fair Division and the Egalitarian Solution'30. William Thomson and Terje Lensberg (1983), `Guarantee Structures for Problems of Fair Division'B Consistency and Its Converse31. Terje Lensberg (1987), `Stability and Collective Rationality'32. Terje Lensberg (1988), `Stability and the Nash Solution'33. Youngsub Chun (2002), `The Converse Consistency Principle in Bargaining'PART IV ENRICHING THE MODEL A Adding Information About Underlying Set of Physical Alternatives34. Richard E. Kihlstrom, Alvin E. Roth and David Schmeidler (1981), `Risk Aversion and Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem'35. Alvin E. Roth and Uriel G. Rothblum (1982), `Risk Aversion and Nash's Solution for Bargaining Games with Risky Outcomes'36. Zvi Safra, Lin Zhou and Itzhak Zilcha (1990), `Risk Aversion in the Nash Bargaining Problem with Risky Outcomes and Risky Disagreement Points'37. John E. Roemer (1988), `Axiomatic Bargaining Theory on Economic Environments'38. Ariel Rubinstein, Zvi Safra and William Thomson (1992), `On the Interpretation of the Nash Bargaining Solution and its Extension to Non-Expected Utility Preferences'39. Zvi Safra and Itzhak Zilcha (1993), `Bargaining Solutions without the Expected Utility Hypothesis'40. Simon Grant and Atsushi Kajii (1995), `A Cardinal Characterization of the Rubinstein-Safra-Thomson Axiomatic Bargaining Theory'B Adding Claims41. Youngsub Chun and William Thomson (1992), `Bargaining Problems with Claims'42. Walter Bossert (1993), `An Alternative Solution to Bargaining Problems with Claims'C Adding Preferences Over Solutions43. Kim C. Border and Uzi Segal (1997), `Preferences Over Solutions to the Bargaining Problem'PART V STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS A Analyzing Bargaining Problems as Strategic Games44. John Nash (1953), `Two-Person Cooperative Games'45. Eric van Damme (1986), `The Nash Bargaining Solution is Optimal'46. Ariel Rubinstein (1982), `Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model'B Manipulation47. Vincent P. Crawford and Hal R. Varian (1979), `Distortion of Preferences and The Nash Theory of Bargaining'48. Joel Sobel (1981), `Distortion of Utilities and the Bargaining Problem'C Implementation49. H. Moulin (1984), `Implementing the Kalai-Smorodinsky Bargaining Solution'50. Eiichi Miyagawa (2002), `Subgame-Perfect Implementation of Bargaining Solutions'PART VI EXPERIMENTS 51. M.E. Yaari and M. Bar-Hillel (1984), `On Dividing Justly'