Truth and normativity: an inquiry into the basis of everyday moral claims/ Brassington, Iain Iain Brassington

Contents
Preface vii
1 'There Are No Innocents': Why we Should be Worried
about Moral Philosophy 1
Making Moral Arguments 1
The Moral Terrorist? 6
Other Terrorists 9
Terrorism and the Democratic State: Unelected Affinities 14
The Ship of State and its Galley Slaves 17
The Blurred Borders 20
Opening the Question 23
2 Independentism: Moral Truth and the Lack Thereof 27
Independentism and Dependentism 27
Realist Independentism 30
Realist Independentism and Queer Science 34
The Rejection of Realist Independentism 37
Idealist Independentism: Kant and his Heirs 45
The Importance of the Will 48
The Problem of Formalism 53
The Metaphysics of Reason and the Problem of Taxonomy 58
Reason and the Moral Will 64
Independentism and Commonsense Morality 67
3 Dependentism-Buying Truth and Pawning Normativity 69
If You Know What's Good for You: Eudaimonism 72
Souls, Naturally 76
Cosmology as a Moral Tool 78
In Defence of Politics 84
Eudaimonism, Cosmology and Essentialism 86
Moral Feelings 90
Instrumentalism and the a priori 98
Morality and the Snark IQI
4 The Reality of Values: Heidegger and Moral Thought 105
Morality and Commonsense 105
Heidegger versus Morality? 107
Truth and Reality in Moral Statements 110
B
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VI Tmth and Normativity
How to Philosophise (with) a Hammer
Appearance and Values
Categorisation and Apophansis
Problems with the Account
Truth and the Possibility of Moral Error
The Embeddedness of Norms
The Problem of Caprice
Publicity, Commonsense and Critique
5 Oughtobiography: Heidegger and Ethical Thought
Agency and Dasein: the Break from Descartes
Writing about Ethics
Pondering the Abode: Authenticity and Finitude
Pondering the Abode: Ethics and Infinity
Morality and Authenticity: The Problem of Nazi Virtues
Ethics and Krisis
Self, World and Other
Democracy, Terrorism and Existence
What is Wrong with Terrorism(?)
Bibliography
Index
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185
Preface
The arguments in this book started life as a PhD thesis written at the University of
Birmingham between 1999 and 2003. The thesis was, I think, reasonable, but needed
alteration before it was suitable for publication; the result of this modification is an
improvement, but I have no illusions that the arguments in this book are perfect.
As such, this book should not be taken as articulating my definitive position on any
matter.
Several people deserve acknowledgement. Primarily, Iain Law deserves massive
credit for his role supervising and supporting my PhD research. Nick Dent also
deserves credit for this. Richard Norman and Joss Walker made valuable comments.
Much of the work towards the revision of the original thesis has been done using
office space at the Centre for Professional Ethics and at the School of Medicine,
both at Keele University: I am particularly grateful to Steve Wilkinson for lending
me his office for 18 months, and to Angus Dawson for allowing the library to think
that I was a member of staff. Credit is also due to the staff and smdents at Newcastle-
under-Lyme School, who tolerated me using their word processors for my work
when I should have been planning lessons; it was the fact that marking would eat
into research time that stopped me setting any homework at all during my spell as a
teacher there.
On a more personal level, I am immensely grateful for the continued support
I- financial and moral - of my family and friends, without whose encouragement I
/ould have abandoned the project and entered the real world ages ago.