Games and information: an introduction to game theory/ (Record no. 186334)
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| 000 -LEADER | |
|---|---|
| fixed length control field | 00337nam a2200133Ia 4500 |
| 020 ## - INTERNATIONAL STANDARD BOOK NUMBER | |
| International Standard Book Number | 9781405136662 |
| 040 ## - CATALOGING SOURCE | |
| Transcribing agency | CUS |
| 082 ## - DEWEY DECIMAL CLASSIFICATION NUMBER | |
| Classification number | 519.3 |
| Item number | RAS/G |
| 100 ## - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
| Personal name | Rasmusen, Eric. |
| 245 #0 - TITLE STATEMENT | |
| Title | Games and information: an introduction to game theory/ |
| Statement of responsibility, etc. | Eric Rasmusen |
| 250 ## - EDITION STATEMENT | |
| Edition statement | 4th ed. |
| 260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. (IMPRINT) | |
| Place of publication, distribution, etc. | Malden: |
| Name of publisher, distributor, etc. | Blackwell, |
| Date of publication, distribution, etc. | 2007. |
| 300 ## - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION | |
| Extent | xxix, 528 p. : |
| Other physical details | ill. ; |
| Dimensions | 26 cm. |
| 505 ## - FORMATTED CONTENTS NOTE | |
| Formatted contents note | List of Figures x <br/>List of Tables xiii <br/>List of Games xv <br/>Preface xviii <br/>Contents and Purpose xviii <br/>Changes in the Second Edition, 1994 xviii <br/>Changes in the Third Edition, 2001 xix <br/>Changes in the Fourth Edition, 2006 xx <br/>Using the Book xxii <br/>The Level of Mathematics xxii <br/>Other Books xxiii <br/>Contact Information xxviii <br/>Acknowledgements xxviii <br/>Introduction 1 <br/>History 1 <br/>Game Theory¿s Method 2 <br/>Exemplifying Theory 2 <br/>This Book¿s Style 4 <br/>Notes 6 <br/>Part 1: Game Theory 9 <br/>1 The Rules of the Game 11 <br/>1.1 Definitions 11 <br/>1.2 Dominated and Dominant Strategies: The Prisoner¿s Dilemma 19 <br/>1.3 Iterated Dominance: The Battle of the Bismarck Sea 22 <br/>1.4 Nash Equilibrium: Boxed Pigs, the Battle of the Sexes and <br/>Ranked Coordination 26 <br/>1.5 Focal Points 32 <br/>Notes 33 <br/>Problems 36 <br/>Classroom Game 38 <br/>2 Information 40 <br/>2.1 The Strategic and Extensive Forms of a Game 40 <br/>2.2 Information Sets 45 <br/>2.3 Perfect, Certain, Symmetric, and Complete Information 49 <br/>2.4 The Harsanyi Transformation and Bayesian Games 52 <br/>2.5 An Example: The Png Settlement Game 61 <br/>Notes 64 <br/>Problems 66 <br/>Classroom Game 68 <br/>3 Mixed and Continuous Strategies 69 <br/>3.1 Mixed Strategies: The Welfare Game 69 <br/>3.2 The Payoff-equating Method and Games of Timing 74 <br/>*3.3 Mixed Strategies with General Parameters and N Players: <br/>The Civic Duty Game 81 <br/>*3.4 Randomizing is not Always Mixing: The Auditing Game 85 <br/>3.5 Continuous Strategies: The Cournot Game 87 <br/>3.6 Continuous Strategies: The Bertrand Game, Strategic Complements, <br/>and <br/>Strategic Substitutes 90 <br/>*3.7 Existence of Equilibrium 95 <br/>Notes 98 <br/>Problems 103 <br/>Classroom Game 107 <br/>4 Dynamic Games with Symmetric Information 108 <br/>4.1 Subgame Perfectness 108 <br/>4.2 An Example of Perfectness: Entry Deterrence I 111 <br/>4.3 Credible Threats, Sunks Costs, and the Open-set Problem in the Game <br/>of <br/>Nuisance Suits 113 <br/>4.4 Recoordination to Pareto-dominant Equilibria in Subgames: <br/>Pareto Perfection 120 <br/>Notes 122 <br/>Problems 123 <br/>Classroom Game 126 <br/>5 Reputation and Repeated Games with Symmetric Information 128 <br/>5.1 Finitely Repeated Games and the Chainstore Paradox 128 <br/>5.2 Infinitely Repeated Games, Minimax Punishments, and the Folk <br/>Theorem 130 <br/>5.3 Reputation: The One-sided Prisoner¿s Dilemma 136 <br/>5.4 Product Quality in an Infinitely Repeated Game 137 <br/>*5.5 Markov Equilibria and Overlapping Generations: Customer Switching <br/>Costs 141 <br/>*5.6 Evolutionary Equilibrium: The Hawk-Dove Game 143 <br/>Notes 147 <br/>Problems 151 <br/>Classroom Game 155 <br/>6 Dynamic Games with Incomplete Information 156 <br/>6.1 Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium: Entry Deterrence II and III 156 <br/>6.2 Refining Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in the Entry Deterrence and <br/>PhD <br/>Admissions Games 160 <br/>6.3 The Importance of Common Knowledge: Entry Deterrence IV and V 164 <br/>6.4 Incomplete Information in the Repeated Prisoner¿s Dilemma: The Gang <br/>of <br/>Four Model 166 <br/>6.5 The Axelrod Tournament 169 <br/>6.6 Credit and the Age of the Firm: The Diamond Model 170 <br/>Notes 172 <br/>Problems 175 <br/>Classroom Game 177 <br/>Part 2: Asymmetric Information 179 <br/>7 Moral Hazard: Hidden Actions 181 <br/>7.1 Categories of Asymmetric Information Models 181 <br/>7.2 A Principal-agent Model: The Production Game 184 <br/>7.3 The Incentive Compatibility and Participation Constraints 194 <br/>7.4 Optimal Contracts: The Broadway Game 195 <br/>Notes 201 <br/>Problems 204 <br/>Classroom Game 209 <br/>8 Further Topics in Moral Hazard 211 <br/>8.1 Efficiency Wages 211 <br/>8.2 Tournaments 214 <br/>*8.3 Institutions and Agency Problems 216 <br/>*8.4 Renegotiation: The Repossession Game 219 <br/>*8.5 State-space Diagrams: Insurance Games I and II 222 <br/>*8.6 Joint Production by Many Agents: The Holmstrom Teams Model 227 <br/>*8.7 The Multitask Agency Problem 230 <br/>Notes 236 <br/>Problems 239 <br/>Classroom Game 242 <br/>9 Adverse Selection 243 <br/>9.1 Introduction: Production Game VI 243 <br/>9.2 Adverse Selection under Certainty: Lemons I and II 249 <br/>9.3 Heterogeneous Tastes: Lemons III and IV 252 <br/>9.4 Adverse Selection under Uncertainty: Insurance Game III 255 <br/>*9.5 Market Microstructure 259 <br/>*9.6 A Variety of Applications 263 <br/>9.7 Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard Combined: Production Game VII <br/>266 <br/>Notes 269 <br/>Problems 272 <br/>Classroom Game 274 <br/>10 Mechanism Design and Postcontractual Hidden Knowledge 276 <br/>10.1 Mechanisms, Unravelling, Cross Checking, and the Revelation <br/>Principle 276 <br/>10.2 Myerson Mechanism Design 287 <br/>10.3 An Example of Postcontractual Hidden Knowledge: The Salesman Game <br/>289 <br/>*10.4 The Groves Mechanism 293 <br/>10.5 Price Discrimination 296 <br/>*10.6 Rate-of-return Regulation and Government Procurement 304 <br/>Notes 314 <br/>Problems 316 <br/>Classroom Game 319 <br/>11 Signalling 320 <br/>11.1 The Informed Player Moves First: Signalling 320 <br/>11.2 Variants on the Signalling Model of Education 324 <br/>11.3 General Comments on Signalling in Education 329 <br/>11.4 The Informed Player Moves Second: Screening 330 <br/>*11.5 Two Signals: The Game of Underpricing New Stock Issues 338 <br/>*11.6 Signal Jamming and Limit Pricing 341 <br/>*11.7 Countersignalling 345 <br/>Notes 348 <br/>Problems 349 <br/>Classroom Game 352 <br/>Part 3: Applications 355 <br/>12 Bargaining 357 <br/>12.1 The Basic Bargaining Problem: Splitting a Pie 357 <br/>12.2 The Nash Bargaining Solution 359 <br/>12.3 Alternating Offers over Finite Time 361 <br/>12.4 Alternating Offers over Infinite Time 362 <br/>12.5 Incomplete Information 365 <br/>*12.6 Setting Up a Way to Bargain: The Myerson¿Satterthwaite Model 369 <br/>Notes 380 <br/>Problems 381 <br/>Classroom Game 384 <br/>13 Auctions 385 <br/>13.1 Values Private and Common, Continuous and Discrete 385 <br/>13.2 Optimal Strategies under Different Rules in Private-value Auctions <br/>390 <br/>13.3 Revenue Equivalence, Risk Aversion, and Uncertainty 403 <br/>13.4 Reserve Prices and the Marginal Revenue Approach 409 <br/>13.5 Common-value Auctions and the Winner¿s Curse 414 <br/>13.6 Asymmetric Equilibria, Affiliation, and Linkage: The Wallet Game <br/>423 <br/>Notes 428 <br/>Problems 430 <br/>Classroom Game 432 <br/>14 Pricing 433 <br/>14.1 Quantities as Strategies: Cournot Equilibrium Revisited 433 <br/>14.2 Capacity Constraints: The Edgeworth Paradox 436 <br/>14.3 Location Models 441 <br/>14.4 Comparative Statics and Supermodular Games 449 <br/>*14.5 Vertical Differentiation 454 <br/>*14.6 Durable Monopoly 461 <br/>Notes 467 <br/>Problems 469 <br/>Classroom Game 471 <br/>Mathematical Appendix 473 <br/>*A.1 Notation 473 <br/>*A.2 The Greek Alphabet 475 <br/>*A.3 Glossary 475 <br/>*A.4 Formulas and Functions 479 <br/>*A.5 Probability Distributions 480 <br/>A.6 Supermodularity 482 <br/>A.7 Fixed Point Theorems 484 <br/>*A.8 Genericity 485 <br/>*A.9 Discounting 486 <br/>*A.10 Risk 487 <br/>References and Name Index 493 <br/>Subject Index 521 |
| 650 ## - SUBJECT | |
| Keyword | Game theory |
| 942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA) | |
| Koha item type | General Books |
| Withdrawn status | Lost status | Damaged status | Not for loan | Home library | Current library | Shelving location | Date acquired | Full call number | Accession number | Date last seen | Koha item type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Central Library, Sikkim University | Central Library, Sikkim University | General Book Section | 29/08/2016 | 519.3 RAS/G | P41348 | 29/08/2016 | General Books |