The economic theory of auctions/ (Record no. 152794)
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000 -LEADER | |
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fixed length control field | 00330nam a2200133Ia 4500 |
020 ## - INTERNATIONAL STANDARD BOOK NUMBER | |
International Standard Book Number | 1858988705 |
020 ## - INTERNATIONAL STANDARD BOOK NUMBER | |
International Standard Book Number | 9781858988702 |
040 ## - CATALOGING SOURCE | |
Transcribing agency | CUS |
082 ## - DEWEY DECIMAL CLASSIFICATION NUMBER | |
Classification number | 330.01 |
Item number | KLE/E |
245 #4 - TITLE STATEMENT | |
Title | The economic theory of auctions/ |
Statement of responsibility, etc. | edited by Paul Klemperer |
260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. (IMPRINT) | |
Name of publisher, distributor, etc. | Elgar Pub., |
Date of publication, distribution, etc. | 2000. |
Place of publication, distribution, etc. | Cheltenham: |
300 ## - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION | |
Extent | 2 v. : |
Other physical details | ill. ; |
Dimensions | 25 cm. |
505 ## - FORMATTED CONTENTS NOTE | |
Formatted contents note | Acknowledgements --<br/>Part X. Multiunit Auctions --<br/>A. Optimal --<br/>1. Optimal Multi-unit Auctions --<br/>2. Bundling Decisions by a Multiproduct Monopolist with Incomplete Information --<br/>B. Simultaneous --<br/>3. Auctions of Shares --<br/>4. Auctions of Divisible Goods: On the Rationale for the Treasury Experiment --<br/>5. Coordination in Split Award Auctions --<br/>6. Supply Function Equilibria in Oligopoly Under Uncertainty --<br/>7. Auctions with Endogenous Quantity --<br/>C. Sequential --<br/>8. A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding, II --<br/>9. Rational Frenzies and Crashes --<br/>10. The Declining Price Anomaly --<br/>11. Multiple-Object Auctions --<br/>Part XI. Royalties, Incentive Contracts and Payments for Quality --<br/>12. Ex Post Information in Auctions --<br/>13. Auctioning Incentive Contracts --<br/>14. Design Competition through Multidimensional Auctions --<br/>Part XII. Double Auctions, etc. --<br/>A. Double Auctions --<br/>15. Bargaining under Incomplete Information --<br/>16. Incentive Efficiency of Double Auctions --<br/>17. Convergence to Efficiency in a Simple Market with Incomplete Information --<br/>18. A Dominant Strategy Double Auction --<br/>B. Related Two-Sided Trading Mechanisms --<br/>19. Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading --<br/>20. Dissolving a Partnership Efficiently --<br/>Part XIII. Other Topics --<br/>A. Budget Constraints --<br/>21. Standard Auctions with Financially Constrained Bidders --<br/>B. Externalities between Bidders --<br/>22. Strategic Nonparticipation --<br/>C. Jump Bidding --<br/>23. Strategic Jump Bidding in English Auctions --<br/>D. War of Attrition --<br/>24. The Generalized War of Attrition --<br/>E. Competing Auctioneers --<br/>25. Mechanism Design by Competing Sellers --<br/>Part XIV. Testing the Theory --<br/>A. Empirical --<br/>26. Game Theory and Empirical Economics: The Case of Auction Data --<br/>B. Experimental --<br/>27. Auctions: A Survey of Experimental Research --<br/>Name Index. |
650 ## - SUBJECT | |
Keyword | Auctions |
700 ## - ADDED ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
Personal name | Klemperer, Paul, ed. |
942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA) | |
Koha item type | General Books |
Withdrawn status | Lost status | Damaged status | Not for loan | Home library | Current library | Shelving location | Date acquired | Serial Enumeration / chronology | Full call number | Accession number | Date last seen | Koha item type |
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Central Library, Sikkim University | Central Library, Sikkim University | General Book Section | 28/08/2016 | v.2 | 330.01 KLE/E | P07575 | 28/08/2016 | General Books |